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German Foreign Policy and 
Eastern Partnership
Problem Definition
The Eastern Partnership is more than an instrument 
of  EU foreign policy. Stabilization and democratiza-
tion are essential components of  both European and 
German foreign policy. However, German policy in 
respect of  the countries of  the Eastern Partnership1 is 
too passive; it is completely absorbed with the finan-
cial and monetary crisis. Independent of  this, there is 
a lack of  strategic thinking, alertness, coherence and 
consistency. On historical, cultural, as well as economic 
grounds, the eastern European neighborhood provides 
a point of  focus for German foreign policy. However, 
Germany has failed to make sufficient use of  this 
opportunity. It has failed to adequately define its new 
identity as a country in the center of  Europe, either 
following the upheavals of  1989/91 and German 
reunification, or after the EU’s eastern enlargement of  
2004 and 2007: The existing bilateral and multilateral 
forms of  cooperation have not been precisely defined 
in order to develop a sustainable, long-term European 
strategy which embraces German interests. Instead, 
they largely remain short-term and ineffective. Do-
mestic political interests are the current mainsprings 
of  foreign policy, while international considerations, 
1  Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine.
in the absence of  a clear definition of  foreign policy 
goals and interests, receive insufficient attention. Fur-
thermore, self-critical reflection is required in respect 
of  the observance of  democratic and constitutional 
principles within the EU. 
In order for Germany, as a member of  the EU and 
NATO, to develop a coherent foreign policy in respect 
of  the countries of  the eastern neighborhood the dif-
ferent perspectives, thought structures and positions 
must be recognized.  The frequently cited dichotomy 
between a democracy guided by values and the promo-
tion of  economic development governed by interests, 
neither stands the test of  a practical political analysis, 
nor is it conducive to the development of  an opera-
tional policy. Values and interests are two sides of  the 
same coin: The promotion of  the rule of  law and 
transparency, the dismantling of  corruption, as well 
as the development of  open markets and economic 
integration, result from an interest in political and eco-
nomic stability and form the basis for the development 
of  democracy, pluralism and human rights standards. 
If  a society succeeds in developing a consensus of  
values on this basis, then it will enjoy long-term stabil-
ity. This is the experience of  the western democracies. 
Stability based on repression will not prevail in the 
long-term. 
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The foreign policy discourse in Germany avoids ad-
dressing geostrategic issues. However, the reality of  
the situation must be recognized: When Russia speaks 
of  stability it is thinking in terms of  the balance of  
forces and spheres of  influence. Consequently, it is just 
as legitimate to view the Eastern Partnership within 
the context of  geostrategic considerations. With this 
concept the European Union aims to disseminate its 
political, legal and economic “rules of  the game”, and 
thus effect a step by step integration of  the region. In 
the process, the EU, through certain offers of  cooper-
ation, attempts to prevent the economic plight of  the 
eastern partners leading them to accept other integra-
tion models in conflict with European interests. 
Orientation Recommendations
1. Individual EU member states ascribe the Eastern 
Partnership different levels of  importance. As a 
result, the EU operates on the basis of  the low-
est common denominator. In order to accord the 
Eastern Partnership priority Germany should place 
greater emphasis on cooperation with Poland as 
a component of  the EU’s eastern foreign policy. 
Poland and Germany assume a special role in this 
matter. The linking of  Polish and German interests 
generates synergies. Both states command consider-
able economic as well as political weight. Together, 
plausible strategies can be developed and the majori-
ties required for fashioning EU foreign policy can 
be won. Germany is guided by economic interests 
in Russia, however it does not define any concrete 
issues in respect of  the countries of  the Eastern 
Partnership. In contrast, Poland largely formulates 
its interests in respect of  its eastern neighbors in 
terms of  security policy. However, despite obvious 
progress, Poland has failed to establish a definition 
of  its interests in respect of  Russia which extends 
beyond efforts at a harmonization of  the strained 
relations. Russia is not a member of  the European 
Partnership, nevertheless it is a partner with whom 
the EU must constructively engage on issues of  
neighborhood policy. 
2. Conditionality, which declares certain democratic 
and constitutional reforms as conditions for coop-
eration, should be subjected to critical scrutiny as 
it has little substance in terms of  practical politics. 
Such reforms are the goal and not the precondition 
for cooperation with states whose transformation 
is still in a state of  flux. When political conditional-
ity is vehemently demanded on the one side – as 
exemplified by the EU Commission’s new approach 
of  “more for more” – but is not consistently and 
vigorously implemented on the other, then this leads 
to a loss of  credibility and the accusation of  double 
standards on the part of  those affected. Democ-
racy cannot be exported, it can only be promoted 
through cooperation: A democratic system that 
develops according to the given historical, cultural, 
social and economic circumstances, should, amongst 
other things, be participative, accountable and 
transparent, as well as responding to the needs of  its 
citizens. Germany and the European Union should 
not set themselves up as “moral judges”. Instead, 
they should accept the autonomous nature of  the 
demand for political concepts, flexibly devise co-
operation through the negotiation of  fundamental 
standards, and not block future cooperation. Coop-
eration contributes more to the system transforma-
tion of  autocracies than their isolation. 
3. Germany and the EU must pay more attention to 
the heterogeneous stakeholder structures within 
the partner countries. Their “black boxes” must be 
opened and a balanced, continuous and sustainable 
cooperation pursued with different local, regional, 
1
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economic, political, scientific, and civil society stake-
holders with diverging interests. Experience teaches 
us that an exclusive focus on the ruling elite at the 
expense of  civil society is an impediment to demo-
cratic development. Furthermore, in the event of  
changing power relations, this can result in a signifi-
cant loss of  influence and long-term difficulties in 
accessing political communities. 
4. The completion of  the free trade zone with the 
states of  the Eastern Partnership and Russia serves 
the interests of  both sides. Germany’s economy 
would profit considerably from the dismantling of  
trade restrictions. The EU demands from members 
of  the Eastern Partnership that they adopt its body 
of  law, the acquis communautaire. This attitude 
must be critically scrutinized as it not only creates 
an asymmetrical negotiating position but can ulti-
mately appear protectionist if  the specific conditions 
and needs of  the partners are not understood. The 
EU, and Germany in particular, must not view its 
Eastern Partnership countries as simply markets 
with potential consumers and favorable production 
zones with qualified workforces. Instead, they must 
be provided with the opportunity to export prod-
ucts to the EU. Imports do not represent a form 
of  destructive competition for the European and 
German economies. Quite the opposite. Export op-
portunities for the Eastern Partnership states would 
promote modernization and the development of  a 
small and medium sized business sector, which in 
the long-term would support the development of  
democracy and human rights. The precondition for 
concluding a free trade agreement with the EU is 
the development of  constitutional governance. This 
constitutes a decision in favor of  a particular sys-
tem. The associated qualitative improvement in the 
investment climate for European Union companies 
will in turn stimulate economic and socio-political 
developments in the partner countries. For example, 
in the long term, the introduction of  a free trade 
zone with the Republic of  Moldova would consti-
tute a more sustainable incentive for resolving the 
Transnistrian conflict than political initiatives such as 
the Meseberg Process - ultimately the Transnistrian 
elite would surely seek to profit from the economic 
advantages of  the free trade zone. 
5. It is in the political as well as economic interests of  
both Germany and Europe to promote visa liberal-
ization. The German industry’s Committee on East-
ern European Economic Relations has already taken 
up a clear position on this issue and formulated con-
crete recommendations. Furthermore, cross-border 
exchange programs promote the development of  
civil societies and thus the transformation processes. 
Nevertheless, the Federal Government has been act-
ing restrictively in this respect, thus obstructing the 
entire process. For the implementation of  visa-free 
regions an overall strategy is required. Due to the 
historical entanglement of  the Eastern Partnership 
states with Russia and the resulting multiple citizen-
ship of  numerous citizens, the practical implementa-
tion of  visa liberalization, for example for Ukraine 
while excluding Russia (or vice versa), will prove 
difficult and politically problematic. The blockade 
of  European decisions by individual EU member 
states who fail to resist domestic political pressure 
needs to be more clearly distinguished from techni-
cal constraints on the road to implementation, and 
dealt with accordingly. 
6. Germany’s contribution to the development of  EU 
foreign policy must be differentiated according to 
regional and country-specific factors. Each coun-
try of  the Eastern Partnership must be considered 
separately. Thinking in categories is inappropriate. 
Every form of  rapprochement with the EU requires 
DGAPstandpunkt 2012/1 4
German Foreign Policy and 
Eastern Partnership
an individually coordinated strategy. Bilateral rela-
tionships and an individual willingness to integrate 
must not be made dependent on developments in 
other countries. The southern and eastern dimen-
sions of  European neighborhood policy must be 
differentiated according to regional needs and de-
mands and not treated in a uniform manner. 
7. The EU’s enlargement policy has lost its vigor. On 
the one side integration is justified by the inability 
of  each individual European state to solve pres-
ent and future problems alone; on the other, the 
Eastern Partnership countries are denied a credible 
perspective for accession. The experience of  eastern 
enlargement has shown that a realistic accession 
perspective eases and accelerates the reform pro-
cess, whilst the absence of  such a credible perspec-
tive – as in the case of  Turkey – has a negative effect 
on the willingness to reform. The EU’s ambiguous 
position on enlargement policy leads to frustra-
tion amongst the Eastern Partnership countries as 
the respective offers from the EU fail to live up to 
expectations. Since the last eastern enlargement, the 
EU gives the impression of  being afraid of  its own 
courage. An accession perspective is not an enforce-
able promise but a commonly defined strategic goal. 
On the road to accession intermediate steps in the 
form of  stepwise and differentiated integration 
are conceivable. Successive integration can already 
be seen in the ongoing negotiations on a free visa 
regime, for acceptance into the Schengen region, the 
euro zone, and the energy community, for mem-
bership of  certain collaborative programs and EU 
agencies, as well as participation in instruments for 
greater cooperation in common foreign and security 
policy matters. Negotiations on the free trade agree-
ment already imply the acceptance of  up to 80% of  
the acquis communautaire. The successive participa-
tion in the domestic market and further communi-
ties means the de facto adoption of  a large part of  
the EU’s body of  law. The desire for political code-
termination within the EU presupposes fulfillment 
of  the Copenhagen Criteria in their entirety and the 
granting of  full EU membership. 
In summary we put on record:
The Eastern Partnership is of  central importance for 
the development of  a foreign policy strategy for the 
European Union. It is in Germany’s interest to deci-
sively influence this process. To this end, the Federal 
Government should appoint a Special Representa-
tive for the Eastern Partnership who will coordinate 
strategic considerations at the national level, establish 
their political visibility and bring them to bear on the 
formulation of  European foreign policy in a concerted 
manner. 
The work of the task force was carried out in cooperation with the Robert Bosch Stiftung
